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Abstract 
 
 
A calibrated model is used to determine the welfare impacts of various regulatory 
instruments for improving health. The results of a lab experiment are integrated in a partial 
equilibrium model representing demands for two kinds of fish, one with higher nutritional 
benefits (canned sardines) and one with higher contamination risks (canned tuna) in France. In 
the laboratory, information about health effects leads to a statistically significant decrease 
(increase) in the willingness to pay for tuna (sardines). Simulations with the laboratory results 
show that, for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without any 
information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy 
directly internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax 
on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of 
consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information.  
 
Keywords: health, information, regulation, taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
Food is a major contributor to health. “Eating well” always emerges as one of the top 
recommendations for reducing risks of heart disease, diabetes, cancer, osteoporosis, and other 
medical conditions, as is clearly shown on the famous Harvard website, Your Disease Risk.1 
There are intense debates in Western countries about the best way to promote healthy eating for 
reducing risks, with a particular focus on obesity. Nutritional advice is often seen as too limited 
in its impact to reverse current trends in nutrition-related diseases. Numerous public health 
experts and politicians in many countries have proposed imposing a tax on fat/sugar or offering a 
subsidy on “thin” foods such as fruits and vegetables (see Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). Other 
experts (see Kuchler et al., 2005) note that taxes raise revenues that could be used for educational 
programs or advertising for healthy products. The debate is surrounded by a lot of uncertainty 
about choices among regulatory tools and also about the way to finance them. 
To shed light on this regulatory question, we restrict our attention to fish consumption. The 
safety and nutrition of fish consumption have become an increasing public health concern in 
recent years. Fish consumption involves a balance between benefits such as omega-3 fatty acids 
and risks such as methylmercury. There are large differences among fish species regarding their 
health-promoting content. Information is a classical instrument for emphasizing health benefits 
and risks, but it is often doomed to failure because of consumers’ confusion about different 
species or their lack of attention to health messages. A tax-subsidy program may complement an 
information policy and it may also finance it. The example of fish consumption was chosen 
because fish has the advantage of being a main source of omega-3 and of methylmercury, which 
facilitates regulatory simulations because of separability from other products in the regulatory 
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decision. In this sense, issues involved in the regulation of fish differ a lot from questions 
surrounding obesity. Obesity involves numerous goods and nutrients (see Kuchler et al., 2005), 
which makes it very difficult to determine an optimal regulatory program entailing taxes, 
subsidies, and/or information revealed to consumers. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of a health taxation/subsidy program 
and/or information on fish consumption and consumers’ welfare. For determining the optimal 
program, we combine the results of a laboratory experiment with a partial equilibrium model. 
We conducted a lab experiment in Dijon, France, in order to focus on choices between canned 
sardines and canned tuna by taking into account revealed information about methylmercury and 
omega-3.  
The partial equilibrium model is calibrated for representing demands of canned sardines and 
tuna in France. Linear demand opens the possibility of computing the fiscal budgets related to 
regulation in the fish market. Both a per-unit tax imposed on tuna because of methylmercury, 
and a per-unit subsidy supplied for sardines because of omega-3 are selected to maximize 
welfare by taking into account a costly information policy. 
Different options regarding the fiscal budget linked to the regulatory tools are considered in 
the study, whether or not the opportunity to earmark tax revenues for subsidizing healthy fish 
and/or information is justified. Under a first fiscal program, the budget linked to fish regulation 
is not balanced (it is complemented by a lump-sum transfer provided by the rest of the economy 
and taken into account in the welfare assessment), while under the second fiscal program, the 
budget linked to fish regulation is balanced. For this second program, balancing a tax, subsidy, 
and the cost of information about fish, simulations are essential because simple analytical 
solutions do not exist.   
                                                                                                                                                             
1 See http://www.yourdiseaserisk.harvard.edu/ (available, April 2007). 
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The results are as follows. The changes in willingness to pay (WTP) in the lab experiment 
for canned tuna and canned sardines are statistically significant after the revelation of health 
information. Information about methylmercury and omega-3 leads to a WTP decrease for tuna 
and to a WTP increase for sardines. Since the impact of information is statistically significant, it 
is possible to use these results for evaluating different policy options in the calibrated model. 
The simulations of regulatory instruments then show that with relatively few consumers 
receiving health information, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without 
information are welfare superior, because both the tax and subsidy internalize health characteristics 
not taken into account by unaware consumers. Combining a tax on tuna and a subsidy on sardines 
with an information policy is socially preferable if a large proportion, namely, greater than 95%, of 
consumers can receive the health information, and if the cost of information is not too large. When 
all consumers receive the information, no tax/subsidy is imposed if the regulatory budget for fish 
does not need to be balanced, while the information policy is combined with a tax on both tuna and 
sardines for financing when this budget has to be balanced. Whatever the instrument selected, the 
welfare resulting from the program that does not balance the regulatory budget for fish is very close 
to the one that balances the regulatory budget for fish. This implies that a regulation on a fish market 
may be autonomously implemented without relying on alternative sources of finance (as a lump-sum 
transfer provided by the rest of the economy).  
Despite various limitations coming from the experiment and the calibration, the 
combinations of tax, subsidy, and information computed in this study are informative simulations 
that provide credible suggestions for the choice of instruments by a regulator aiming at welfare 
maximization. We consider the results credible given (i) the statistical significance of the 
consumption changes following the revelation of information in the experiment, and (ii) the 
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relatively low values of price elasticities for tuna and sardines used for calibration, entailing 
relatively low variations of linear demand curves coming from price changes due to regulatory 
choices. Hence, the demand variations are relatively close to variations coming from the ones 
defined with a calibrated model based on a non-linear demand curve.  
This paper contributes to various aspects of regulatory debates. From a methodological point 
of view our paper adds to the literature by directly taking into account experimental results from 
a lab for simulating various regulatory options.2 This methodology supports public debates about 
the best way to promote healthy products. Despite limitations, different regulatory scenarios may 
be tested ex ante, and the methodology renders lab experiments useful for policy analysis, which 
is an important challenge for experimental economics (see List, 2007). 
From a theoretical point of view, we add to the literature by considering a combination of 
regulatory instruments often overlooked (see Teisl and Roe, 1998). The literature is lacking 
studies about the combination of information and tax/subsidy programs. In our paper, the role of 
a Pigouvian tax is twofold, since it limits a negative damage linked to a risk and it also 
contributes, in part or in full, to financing other regulatory instruments. This differs from 
previous contributions on the best way to finance regulation, as, for instance, in Marette and 
Crespi (2005), which does not consider the Pigouvian tax.  
Our paper also adds to the debate on regulatory approaches in health policy.3 It differs from 
previous contributions that study the effects of taxation or subsidization of products for dealing 
                                                 
2 The experimental procedures differs from previous contributions studying willingness to pay (i.e., how much 
consumers are ready to pay for a given product) with auctions à la Vickrey (1961) for a single product, since this 
paper uses an alternative choice procedure eliciting the propensity to substitute two products for each other (for how 
much of an alternative product consumers are ready to exchange a given quantity of endowed products). The 
methodology of this paper is tailored to nutrition issues, in which policy aims at substituting healthy products for 
risky products.   
3 Regarding the methylmercury problem, our paper differs from those of Gayer and Hahn (2005, 2006), which focus 
on environmental regulations capping power plant emissions of mercury. Our paper looks at a different step in the 
chain of mercury contamination by focusing on the fish market.  
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with obesity problems. Papers in that area focus on either a fat tax (Jacobson and Brownell, 
2000; Kuchler et al., 2005; and Chouinard et al., 2007) or a thin subsidy (Cash et al., 2006 and 
Gustavsen and Rickertsen, 2006), while our paper focuses on both a tax and a subsidy combined 
with an information program. Including both a tax and a subsidy shows the importance of 
considering both risks and benefits coming from a product in determining regulation. Moreover, 
we pay specific attention to the budget constraint for the regulator. In comparison to existing 
papers on food taxes/subsidies, we go further by computing an optimal tax/subsidy program 
maximizing welfare. This is possible because we have from the lab an estimate of the cost of 
ignorance, which is absent in other studies that rely on more normative approaches to achieve 
results consistent with nutrition recommendations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the debate about fish consumption 
and regulation. Section 3 focuses on a simple model taking into account the instruments, while 
section 4 details the lab experiment. The model calibration of the canned fish market in France 
and the simulations of the regulation are presented in section 5. Conclusions are discussed in 
section 6. 
 
2. The Regulatory Debate over Health and Fish Consumption 
Fish consumption involves a balance between benefits (mainly coming from omega-3s) and risks 
(mainly coming from methylmercury), and there are large differences among fish species in 
terms of their health-promoting content (see table 1).  
First, omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids confer benefits to the fetus such as infant 
cognition and improvement in cardiovascular health (EFSA, 2005, p. 1). A recent Lancet article 
reinforced the momentum for benefits linked to omega-3s by suggesting that fish consumption is 
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crucial during pregnancy (see Hibblen, 2007). Adults also benefit from omega-3s through a 
significant reduction in risks of cardiovascular diseases for those who consume these fatty acids 
(Sidhu, 2003). Fatty fish (like salmon, sardines, or mackerel) are particularly rich in omega-3 
(see table 1). 
Second, methylmercury, an organic form of mercury, is a toxic compound that alters fetal 
brain development when there is significant prenatal exposure (EFSA, 2005). Children of women 
who consume large amounts of fish before and during pregnancy are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse neurological effects of methylmercury (Budtz-Jorgensen et al., 2002). A high level of 
methylmercury is concentrated in long-lived, predatory fish, such as tuna, shark, and swordfish 
(Mahaffey et al., 2004) (see table 1). 
The regulatory choice of how to manage this risk and/or to promote this benefit is complex 
because of the species heterogeneity regarding the omega-3 and methylmercury contents. In 
other words, promoting fish consumption and limiting methylmercury contamination should be 
the regulatory target. For the mercury problem, there are four main ways for a regulator to 
intervene, namely, (1) to regulate the mercury emissions from power plants; (2) to regulate the 
methylmercury content of fish via a minimum quality/safety standard; (3) to inform the 
concerned public via advertising, health warnings or labels (posted on products or in restaurants); 
and (4) to select a tax/subsidy program for limiting consumption of dangerous foods and 
promoting the consumption of healthy foods. Beales et al. (1981) mention the importance of 
combining instruments for limiting the potential distortions/costs coming from each instrument. 
Regulatory instruments need some monitoring and enforcement capacity. We briefly review 
advantages and inconveniences of these three instruments for managing the risks of 
methylmercury. 
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First, the regulator may try to cap the emission of mercury by industry. Mercury comes from 
both industry and natural sources (from volcanoes for instance). The emitted mercury is 
deposited in freshwater, where it becomes methylmercury, which then contaminates fish. In 
2000, the United States decided to regulate mercury emissions from power plants due to coal 
burning. Gayer and Hahn (2005, 2006) show that the costs of this regulation outweigh the 
benefits. In other words, the regulation imposes a large cost on firms while the impact on fish 
contamination and related child IQ scores are very limited, because of weak evidence on the 
chain of causality from power plants to fetus absorption due to fish consumption (see figure 3, p. 
303, in Gayer and Hahn, 2006).4 These findings should lead regulators to favor intervention in 
fish consumption for reaching regulatory efficiency. 
The second instrument consists in applying a minimum quality/safety standard that 
determines a maximum level of methylmercury in fish with which all fisheries should comply. 
Setting standards can be an efficient policy tool because it simply eliminates those products that 
do not comply with certain minimum requirements. Under existing European Regulation No. 
78/2005 (EC, 2005), the maximum level of mercury is 0.5 mg/kg for fish, while the maximum 
level of mercury is 1 mg/kg for predatory fish. Reinforcing the standard with a decrease of the 
threshold lower than 0.5 mg/kg for all fish would be very costly to implement, since numerous 
fish with a mercury level above the new threshold would be withdrawn from the market. 
Moreover, the testing procedure, as in the large-scale testing system developed by Micro 
Analytical Systems Inc. (Adamy, 2005), would also be costly for fisheries. 
The third instrument is the revelation of information (via generic advertising, educational 
programs, press release, brochures at hospitals, labeling, etc.). Several OECD countries, 
                                                 
4 The European Commission has recently proposed legislation to ban all European Union exports of mercury 
beginning in 2011, mainly coming from a Spanish state-owned firm (EC, 2006). The export ban is expected to 
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including the United States since 2001 (EPA, 2004), have decided to broadcast specific 
advisories stipulating that vulnerable groups (small children, pregnant women, and women of 
childbearing age) should consume fish while avoiding species at the high end of the food chain 
because of high levels of methylmercury contamination. The broadcast and information 
programs, which vary among countries, generally use the Internet, mass media, or brochures 
distributed by gynecologists and obstetricians. The 2001 US advisory was found to have its 
intended effect, as pregnant women reduced their consumption of fish (Oken et al., 2003 and 
Shimshack et al., 2007).  
However, the US advisory on methylmercury raised strong criticisms by doctors who argued 
in favor of the large benefits of omega-3 fatty acids for fetuses (The Economist, 2006b). 
According to The Economist (2006a, p. 14), “the researchers note that American guidelines 
recommending that pregnant women should not eat fish because it may contain mercury have the 
perverse effect of cutting off those women (and their fetuses) from one of the best sources of 
omega-3s.” All the messages explicitly mention the benefits of fish consumption while they 
differ about the details linked to the benefits, since omega-3 or fatty fish rich in omega-3 (like 
salmon, sardines, and mackerel) are not always mentioned. For omega-3 benefits, advertising 
and information campaigns by cardiologists/hospitals or by associations like the American Heart 
Association may influence both women and men. The main problem with warnings5 or 
recommendations about fish is the difficulty of species recollection. Roosen et al. (2007) show 
that during a field experiment consumers imperfectly recalled fish species quoted in a warning 
for mercury. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduce global supply and emissions of the heavy metal into the environment. 
5 Mandatory labeling signaling mercury could also be posted on canned tuna. This type of label may compete with 
environmental labels such as “Dolphin-Safe” information also posted on canned tuna (see Teisl et al., 2002). 
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The fourth instrument is taxation for fish with high mercury content and subsidization for 
fish with high omega-3 content.6 There are many inconveniences linked to the tax/subsidy but 
they may be complementary to previous instruments. First, a tax is generally preferable to a 
subsidy because the tax generates revenues for the government, whereas the subsidy requires the 
government to raise revenues elsewhere. However, tax revenues on dangerous fish could be 
earmarked for subsidizing healthy fish.  
The earmarking presents drawbacks since “there is no general reason … that the revenue 
raised by the efficient corrective tax on some polluting activity will exactly equal the efficient 
level of expenditure on mitigating the harm suffered” (Brett and Keen, 2000, p. 316).7 
Earmarking may be one way to bypass politically weakness (Brett and Keen, 2000) or to get 
large political support by consumers/voters (Buchanan, 1969, and Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). 
A tax linked to high content of methylmercury is likely to be “regressive,” since the resulting 
price distortion would negatively affect a surplus of consumers who are not concerned (namely, 
households without kids) or who are already informed about this problem.  
While the link between food and health raises many questions, we focus on one central 
economic aspect of the debate: the link between information and a tax/subsidy program. A 
simple model is proposed for measuring the impact of a tax, a subsidy, and/or information on 
                                                 
6 The liability of producers or regulators could also arise. One aspect of the recent debate in the US is on whether 
tuna canners should be held liable for lack of information about risks. Even if consumers may have difficulties either 
knowing or proving that firms are responsible for a sanitary problem, firms may be liable for misrepresentation. 
There have been lawsuits filed against tuna canners in California for lack of information regarding mercury 
(Kinsman, 2004), but these have thus far been unsuccessful for plaintiffs. For instance, a proposal for mandatory 
labeling on canned tuna regarding mercury was dismissed by a court in California in 2006 after intense lobbying by 
the canned tuna industry (Waldman, 2006). 
7 A tax/subsidy program raises the issue of the “double dividend,” since a tax (or a subsidy) not only improves 
safety/environment but also reduces (or increases) the other costs of the tax system in particular on the labor market 
(see Parry, 1995 and 1998, and Brett and Keen, 2000, for details). 
 10
consumer reaction and market mechanisms (alternative assumptions will be discussed at the end 
of the paper).8 We now turn to the simple model. 
 
3. A Simple Theoretical Model 
We use a simple model that will be calibrated to French data. We combined Spence’s (1976) 
quasilinear utility function with the approach by Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) for the treatment 
of health information in a demand function. Spence’s (1976) specification of the utility function 
of imperfect substitutes is consistent with the assumption of separability of the two goods in 
question from all other goods that drives our experiment (see section 4).9 The utility function of a 
consumer k={1,…,K} concerned by the revealed information is 
2 2( , , ) / 2 / 2 ( )k tk sk k t tk t tk s sk s sk tk sk tk tk sk sk kU x x w x x x x x x I r x h x wα β α β γ= − + − − + − + + ,       (1) 
subject to , 0tk tkx x ≥  and where kw  is the numeraire good; 2 / 2t tk t tkx xα β−  (respectively, 
2 / 2s sk s skx xα β− ) is the immediate satisfaction from consuming a quantity tkx  of tuna 
(respectively, skx  of sardines). The parameter γ  describes the degree of substitutability between 
the two products with [ , ]t sMinγ β β<  for concavity. The parameter I represents the information 
context. If no information has been revealed then I=0. Conversely, I=1 means that the subject 
received information. The health risk (or benefit) for consumer k associated with the 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, we only consider a tax on canned tuna (because of a relatively high content in methylmercury) and 
a subsidy on sardines (because of a relatively high content in omega-3). For simplicity, we abstract from the issue of 
the “double dividend” on other markets as the labor market (see Parry, 1998 and Brett and Keen, 2000, for details). 
Instead, we focus on the use of tax income for a subsidy and/or financing the information to consumers. We also 
abstract from firms’ market power in the supply chain for simplifying the tax/subsidy program without any initial 
price distortion that could come from market power (see Calabresi, 1961, or Buchanan, 1969).  
9 In particular, this specification omits the revenue effect. 
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consumption of tuna (sardines) is denoted by tk tkr x−  ( sk skh x ). Thus, the utility weight per-unit 
risk is tkr−  and per-unit health benefit is skh . 
The maximization of (6) under the budget constraint t tk s sk k kp x p x w y+ + = , where ky  
denotes the income of person k, leads to the following inverse demand function for tuna and 
sardines: 
.
.
t t t tk sk tk
s s s sk tk sk
p x x I r
p x x I h
α β γ
α β γ
⎧ = − − −⎪⎨ = − − +⎪⎩
       (2) 
where the period denotes multiplication. After the revelation of information (I=1), a risk 
valuation tkr  reduces the demand for tuna while a benefit valuation skh  leads to a demand 
increase for sardines, compared to an initial situation without information (I=0). Graphically 
speaking, the demand curve for tuna shifts downward, whereas the demand curve for sardines 
shifts upward. We consider both these shifts in the estimation of welfare change. By inverting 
(7), we obtain consumer k’s demand for tuna and sardines: 
2
2
( )( , , )
( )( , , )
t s s s t s s tk sk
tk t s
s t
s t t t s t tk t sk
sk t s
s t
p p I r hx I p p
p p I r hx I p p
α β α γ β γ β γ
β β γ
α β α γ β γ γ β
β β γ
⎧ − − + − +=⎪ −⎪⎨ − − + + +⎪ =⎪ −⎩
.   (3) 
For a consumer receiving the information, health values are internalized via information, 
and the surplus is ( )1( , ,1) (1, , ), (1, , ),k t s k tk t s sk t s kU p p U x p p x p p w= , with 
1 (1, , ) (1, , )k k t tk t s s sk t sw y p x p p p x p p= − − . For a consumer receiving no information, the surplus 
is ( )0( , ,0) (0, , ), (0, , ),k t s k tk t s sk t s kU p p U x p p x p p w=  with 
0 (0, , ) (0, , )k k t tk t s s sk t sw y p x p p p x p p= − − . For them, the cost of ignorance linked to the absence 
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of health awareness is (0, , ) (0, , )k tk tk t s sk sk t sE r x p p h x p p= − + , which is not internalized via the 
demand. When 1k  consumers are aware of the nutrition characteristics (via the health policy) and 
0k  consumers are unaware (with 1 0K k k= + ), the overall welfare is  
( ) ( )( )1
1
1 1 1
( , , ) , ,1 , ,0k Kt s k t s k t s kk k kW p p k U p p U p p E= = += + +∑ ∑ .          (4) 
We now turn to a description of the regulatory tools. The regulator may choose an 
information/education policy (via hospital, maternity ward, etc.) that could reach 1k  consumers 
among the overall K consumers at a cost C, or not informing. The regulator may also impose a 
tax/subsidy program, namely, a per-unit tax tt  on tuna and a per-unit subsidy ss  on sardines. 
Note that a negative ss  corresponds to a tax. For simplicity, we assume that the price variation 
comes only from the tax/subsidy, which means that initial prices before regulation are equal to 
constant marginal costs (under a simplifying assumption of constant returns to scale). 
For determining the budget constraint, recall that the selection of an information policy (I=1) 
reaches 1k  consumers. By using (3), the regulatory budget linked to fish is  
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
(1, , ) (1 ) (0, , )
( , , . )
(1, , ) (1 ) (0, , )
(0, , ) (0, , ) . .
t tk t t s s tk t t s sk
t s k
s sk t t s s sk t t s s
K
t tk t t s s s tk t t s sk k
t I x p t p s I x p t p s
B t s I C
s I x p t p s I x p t p s
t x p t p s s x p t p s I C
=
= +
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + −⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥− + − + − + −⎣ ⎦
+ + − − + − −
∑
∑
        (5) 
We will compare two types of fiscal programs including a tax, a subsidy, and the cost of 
information. The fiscal program 1 will maximize the regulatory program without balancing the 
budget linked to the regulation on the fish market. In other words, the fiscal deficit 
( , , . ) 0t sB t s I C <  (or surplus ( , , . ) 0t sB t s I C > ) is financed by a lump-sum tax (or leads to a lump-
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sum transfer) accounted for in the overall welfare.10 This may correspond to a transfer coming 
from a more general health policy decided by a state. This program is  
1, ,
( , , . ) ( , , . )
t s
t t s s t st s I
Max W p t p s I k B t s I C+ − + .     (6) 
The solution of this program is  
1
1
1
1
1 1*
1 1*
(1 )
(1 )
k K
tk tkk k k
t
k K
tk tkk k k
s
I r r
t
K
I h h
s
K
= = +
= = +
⎧ − +⎪ =⎪⎨ − +⎪ =⎪⎩
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ,       (7) 
where information policy I is determined by the welfare comparison between 
* * * *
1( , , ) ( , , )t t s s t sW p t p s k B t s C+ − +  and * * * *( , ,0) ( , ,0)t t s s t sW p t p s B t s+ − + . The budget constraint 
* *( , , . )t sB t s I C  may be positive or negative depending on the relative values of per-unit benefits 
and risks. 
Absent information (I=0), the values given by (7) correspond to the “classical” Pigouvian 
tax/subsidy and equal the marginal benefit/cost of the health attribute. This value is equal to the 
average benefit/cost over consumers since the individual health risk and benefit tk tkr x−  and 
sk skh x  in equation (1) are linear functions of quantities under the specification given by Polinsky 
and Rogerson (1983).  
An information policy (I=1) leads to a reduction of the values given in (7). A tax is a burden 
for consumers who are already informed or not concerned by the mercury. An information policy 
may fail to reach consumers but it does not impose regressive distortions on consumers’ welfare 
                                                 
10 Because prices are equal to constant marginal costs (under a simplifying assumption of constant returns to scale), 
the possibility to tax producers via a fixed fee (that is not passed on to consumers via the price) is not considered 
(see Marette and Crespi, 2005) for such an extension.  
 14
as taxation. Note that when 1k K=  with I=1, then the optimal program defined by (7) is 
* * 0t st s= = , since all the health characteristics are internalized in demands via the information 
policy reaching all consumers. 
The fiscal program 2 will maximize the regulatory program with a balanced budget linked to 
the regulation on the fish market.11 In other words, the taxes raised on the fish market should 
completely finance spending coming from providing the subsidy and information. The program 
is  
1, ,
( , , . )
. . ( , , . ) 0
t s
t t s st s I
t s
Max W p t p s I k
s t B t s I C
+ −⎧⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
.       (8) 
There is no direct solution (section 5 will provide estimations with the calibrated model). Note 
that if * *,t st s  given by (7) for program 1 leads to 
* *( , , . ) 0t sB t s I C < , then the program ** **,t st s  
maximizing (8) is such that ** **( , , . ) 0t sB t s I C = . In this case, with an information policy (I=1), **ss  
is positive (a subsidy) for a relatively low 1k  for increasing sardines consumption and it may be 
negative (a tax) for a 1k  close to K  for financing the cost of advertising C. 
Before presenting the simulations based on the calibrated model, we now present results 
from the lab experiment that will give average values of the per-unit risk, tkr , and the per-unit 
health benefit, skh . 
 
                                                 
11 A public board dedicated to fish could manage such a program. In France, the OFIMER (Office National 
Interprofessionnel des Produits de la Mer et de L’Aquaculture) is a public board in charge of fish market (see 
http://www.ofimer.fr/Pages/Accueil/1Accueil2004.html, accessed April 2007). It is in charge of a budget for product 
promotion, scientific studies, statistical studies, etc., financed by taxes paid by fisheries.  
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4. The Lab Experiment 
We first detail the protocol before presenting the main results. The French situation is interesting 
because no major diffusion of information has been decided upon yet for methylmercury/omega-
3. Some warnings, mainly for professionals, have been posted on the website of the Agence 
Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, the French food safety agency (AFSSA, 2002 and 
2004). No major broadcasting of information, via obstetricians, maternity hospitals, or booklets, 
was implemented by the health authorities.12 This absence of national informative campaigns 
suggests that in France very few childbearing women are informed about the potential risk of 
methylmercury exposure. We therefore proceeded by employing a lab experiment rather than by 
observing purchase data in a real market setting. 
 
4.1 Presentation of the lab experiment 
We conducted the experiment in Dijon, the main city of Burgundy in France, in multiple sessions 
from January 23, 2006, to January 27, 2006. A sample of 120 women was randomly selected 
based on the quota method and is representative for age groups and socio-economic status for the 
population of the city. As pregnancy and breastfeeding status or being a young child are crucial 
indications for risks linked to methylmercury, we focus on women of childbearing age, namely, 
women between 18 and 45 years of age. Table 2 shows that the distributions over age and female 
activity of this sample are relatively close to those of the French female population. Potential 
participants were contacted by telephone and had to agree to taste both sardines and tuna; 
                                                 
12 One year after the study reported in this paper, the French food safety agency (AFSSA) issued a press release on 
methylmercury (AFSSA, 2006) that led to a few articles in the popular press (see, for instance, LCI, 2006). Tuna, in 
particular, is not mentioned in this press release. To the best of our knowledge, no major dissemination of 
information via obstetricians, maternity hospitals, or booklets is planned in France. 
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otherwise, they were not selected. Once they agreed to attend the session, they received a formal 
invitation letter and a reminder call a few hours before the experimental session. We used the 
INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique) sensory laboratory with kitchen facilities 
and computers for collecting subjects’ responses. Each experimental session lasted one hour and 
included between 4 and 12 women. 
The lab experiment led to necessary restrictions in the number of products considered. As 
table 1 shows, six types of fish comprise 65% of the overall fish consumption in France. As 
salmon, cod, and hake are mainly sold fresh or frozen, they would have been very hard to handle 
during a one-hour experiment. This led us to a selection among three canned fish that are 
relatively handy in a lab and are also representative of French consumption habits (see the last 
column of table 1).  
The choice between tuna and sardines was mainly imposed by the availability of products on 
French grocery shelves in 2005. In a context of a large diversity of cans of different brands and 
weights on the French market, we selected two cans of the French brand “Connétable” that 
satisfy numerous common criteria.13 In other words, we tried to assure the similarity of a 
maximum number of elements (sauce, can color, weight, etc.) for avoiding additional biases. The 
other reason for the selection of tuna and sardines is the considerable difference in contents of 
mercury and omega-3, as shown in table 1. Tuna contains high mercury and low omega-3 levels, 
whereas sardines contain high omega-3 (in fact, the highest among fish) and low mercury levels 
(Sidhu, 2003, table 5, p. 341).  
                                                 
13 Details can be found at http://www.connetable.com/nos_produits/detail.asp?pid=35 (accessed February 2007) for 
tuna and http://www.connetable.com/nos_produits/detail.asp?pid=1 (accessed February 2007) for sardines. The only 
difference regarding the presentation was in the shape of the can. The similarity in weight and price allows a direct 
comparison of the products by the consumers in the experiment. 
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The contrasting contents in terms of mercury and omega-3s have important consequences 
for information revealed during the experiment. A description of the message used in the 
experiment is presented in appendix A. We restricted our attention to one benefit, namely, 
omega-3 fatty acids, and one risk, namely, methylmercury. The message was inspired by 
elements coming from health agencies in different countries as described in the previous 
section.14 
The timing of the experiment is also presented in appendix A. This mechanism focuses on a 
single endowment point, which means we only use one type of product (fish I) for the initial 
endowment to exchange for different quantities of the other product (fish II), which facilitates 
revelation of information to subjects. During the choice procedure, women were asked to choose 
between an endowment of six cans of fish I and a variable number of cans of fish II, varying 
from 1 to 12. We endowed participants with either 6 cans of tuna (endowment tuna) or 6 cans of 
sardines (endowment sardines). Fifty-eight participants (groups A and B) were endowed with 6 
cans of tuna and 57 participants (groups C and D) were endowed with 6 cans of sardines. We 
started with a relatively large number of cans (6), since fish cans have a high shelf life (up to 5 
years). At stages (5ii) and (5iii) defined in appendix A, the sequences of information revelation 
also differ, since groups A and C received details about omega-3s before details about mercury, 
and groups B and D received details about mercury before omega-3s. 
For each choice procedure, namely at stage 5(i) before the revelation of information and at 
stage (5ii) and (5iii) after the revelation of information (see appendix A), participants had to 
indicate their selection in 12 choice situations. The 12 choice situations were presented on a 
single sheet of paper. The number of cans of fish II varied from 1 to 12, each corresponding to 
                                                 
14 We detailed ratios quantifying the relative content of nutrients and contaminants based on table 1, which is 
unusual compared to current public health advisories. This choice provides scientific credibility in our context and 
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one situation. For each line, participants had to choose between 6 cans of fish I and IIq  cans of 
fish II with IIq ∈{1, , 12} (see the choice sheet in Appendix A). The rest of the paper is based on 
a sample of 115 women who completed all choices at stages (5i), (5ii), and (5iii). 
 
4.2 Results 
The idea developed by Binswanger (1980) and Masters and Sanogo (2002) is to use respondents’ 
choices to infer their relative preference and WTP. Based on product substitution, this 
methodology is particularly tailored to our empirical question—searching for details regarding 
the consumption of fish species. The number of cans of fish II at which the consumer switches 
from six cans of fish I to fish II can be interpreted as the point at which the consumer reveals 
indifference (Sanogo and Masters, 2002, p. 257).  
In this experiment, the consumer owns a given quantity of 6=Iq  cans of fish I.15 The 
experiment provides the selected quantities of fish II, IIq . The consumer is indifferent between 
the two product bundles when  
III q~q .          (9) 
Based on the 12 observed choices at stage j with j∈{i, ii, iii } for steps (5i), (5ii), and (5iii) in 
appendix A, the experiment allows us to isolate the quantity jIIq~  for which 
j
I
j
II qq~ ≺1−  and 
j
I
j
II qq~ ; .16 This framework can be adapted to reveal relative WTP. As price Ip  for fish I was 
posted (see point 3 in appendix A), the unknown WTP IIp  for fish II can be determined. It 
                                                                                                                                                             
fits the restricted choice between only two types of fish in the experiment. 
15 As the weight of the cans are almost similar (see table 1), we abstract from the slight quantity difference. 
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follows from previous inequalities that ( )1j jII II I Ip q p q− <  and j jII II I Ip q p q≥ . Rewriting the 
previous inequalities with 6=Iq  leads to the following inequalities: 
6 6
1
j
II
j j
II I II
p
q p q
≤ < −  .         (10) 
Equation (10) implies that the WTP for fish II, jIIp , is approximated by  
6j I
II j
II
pWTP
q
=  .          (11) 
Based on equation (11), we now turn to the WTP estimations coming from the experiment. 
Figure 1 presents the average values of the WTP for sardines (figures at the top for group A and 
B) and tuna (figures at the bottom for group C and D) before and after the revelation of 
information. These average values are based on all participants, including those not changing 
their choices after the revelation of information. Clearly, health information has a significant 
impact on the WTP, since participants substitute sardines for tuna. The WTP for tuna decreases 
because of relatively negative health information, while the WTP for sardines increases because 
of positive health information.17 
From figure 1 it is easy to see that the order of information is determinant. It turns out that 
the information about mercury leads to a significant change in WTP whatever the order. In 
particular, if messages on methylmercury precede messages on omega-3s (for groups B and D), 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 If during the experiment every IIq { }1,...,12∈  only satisfies j jII Iq q;  (only cans of fish II were selected for 
situations 1 to 12), we arbitrarily determined a value 1jIIq = . If during the experiment no jIIq { }1,...,12∈  is observed 
for a respondent, we arbitrarily determined a value jIIq =13. 
17 These results may differ from those that would be obtained in real markets, because of the focus on fish and health 
topics during the experiment. The information is revealed in the lab, a “protected” situation, and differs from regular 
purchase environments, where consumers face numerous sources of information (that are sometimes ambiguous) 
about a very large number of products. This focus in the experiment leads to a very accurate estimation of the cost of 
ignorance. 
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the major shift in WTP comes from the information on methylmercury. In other words, the 
information on omega-3s no longer causes a subsequent change in substitution. Information on 
omega-3s changed WTP significantly only if it came before information about mercury (for 
groups A and C). 
One way to use results from figure 1 for determining regulatory scenarios consists in 
combining WTP coming from the experiment with the calibrated partial equilibrium model 
measuring imperfect substitution between sardines and tuna (see section 3) and being able to 
replicate prices and quantities in the French market.  
 
5. Calibration for Computing Tax, Subsidy, and/or Information Policy 
The calibration allows us to evaluate the market price modification and shifts in agents’ surplus 
that would arise in response to taxes, subsidies, or information revelation based on the model 
presented in section 3 and the results coming from the lab experiment presented in section 4.  
 
5.1 Methodology and data 
From equation (3) in section 3, aggregated market demands for tuna and sardines are given by 
1
( , , )Kt tk t skX x I p p== ∑  and 1 ( , , )Ks sk t skX x I p p== ∑ . Inverting these aggregated demands leads 
to the inverse demand functions 
1
1
( ) .
( ) .
K
tkt k
t t t s
K
sks k
s s t
r
p I X X I
K K K
h
p I X X I
K K K
β γα
β γα
=
=
⎧⎪ = − − −⎪⎨⎪ = − − +⎪⎩
∑
∑ .      (12) 
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By using (12), the differences between aggregate inverse demands with information for all 
consumers (corresponding to a perfect information case) and no information are given by 
1
(1) (0) /Kt t tkkp p r K=− = −∑  for tuna and by 1( ) ( ) /Ks s skkp I p I h K=− = ∑  for sardines. These 
measures will be approximated by the values from the lab experiment where all participants 
received information. For instance, for tuna, the relative difference, ( (1) (0)) / (0)t t tp p p− , allows 
us to define a relative measure of the risk perception compared to the initial price (0)tp . This 
value ( (1) (0)) / (0)t t tp p p−  may be approximated by the expected value of the relative variation 
of the expected WTP coming from the lab experiment. By using (11), a relative measure of the 
impact of information on preferences for product II (sardines or tuna) is given by 
inf
inf
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( )
i i
II II II
II i
II II
E WTP E WTP E q
E WTP E q
δ −= = −       (13) 
where E(.) denotes the expected value over the subjects of the experiments (see figure 1 for these 
values), superscript i denotes the stage (5i) without information, and superscript inf denotes the 
stages (5ii) or (5iii) with information. Thus, IIδ  represents the relative change in the per-unit 
WTP for fish II coming from health information compared to a situation at stage i, where no 
information was revealed. This measure does not depend on the initial endowment with product I. 
By using (12) and (13), the average value of per-unit risks and per-unit benefits for the 
subgroup z are  
1
1
ˆ/
ˆ/
Z
Z
z K z
t tk Z t Tk
z K z
s sk Z s Sk
r r K p
h h K p
δ
δ
=
=
⎧ = = −⎪⎨ = =⎪⎩
∑
∑ ,        (14) 
where Kz is the number of people in a subgroup. The values zTδ  and zSδ  defined in (13) are given 
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by the experiment. The values ˆ tp = €6.1 and ˆ sp = €8.2 are the average market prices per 
kilogram in France for tuna and sardines for the year 2002, the most recent complete year when 
the analysis was undertaken (see table 3). These prices come from the SECODIP database (see 
OFIMER, 2003). The prices per kilogram of “Connétable” cans (respectively €20.62 and €19.42) 
used for the experiment are clearly larger than the average prices of tuna and sardines. This 
implies that high-quality products were used for this experiment (recall from section 4.1 that our 
choice of products for the experiment was very limited). However, the relative WTP changes 
defined by (13) do not depend on the price of the fish I used for the experiment. In other words, 
the values zTδ  and zSδ  measure the relative WTP shifts coming from the information, whatever 
the initial values of fish I and II in the experiment. The absence of any initial prices in (13) 
makes it possible to use these values in a model taking into account overall demands of tuna and 
sardines in 2002. 
The cost of ignorance defined by kE  in section 3 can be estimated using equation (14). To 
estimate the impact of information on demand, we divided the populations (and the overall 
demands) according to their risk status and their consumption habits. The subgroup 1 of 
households concerned by the mercury/omega-3 information includes all households with women 
of childbearing age and/or with young kids under age 14. We assume that men of these 
households also value the absence of methylmercury risks even if they are not directly concerned 
by this risk. Roosen et al. (2007) show that around 75% of fish consumption occurs at home 
(with some very tiny differences among men, women, and children) so that consumption 
behavior is highly correlated among members of the same family. From INSEE (1999), these 
households represent 50.5% of French consumers, so we assume they represent 50.5% of the 
overall demands. For this group, the estimation is given by taking into account the relative 
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difference between the third and first bars in figure 1 since the third bar integrates the overall 
information (with both mercury and omega-3s). The average over groups A and B leads to a 
value 1 0.81Sδ =  for sardines and the average over groups C and D leads to a value 1 0.26Tδ = − . 
By using average prices for 2002 (see table 3) and equation (14), this leads to a per-unit risk 
valued at 
1
1.59tr =  and a per-unit benefit valued at 1 6.69sh = .  
We assume that the other households (subgroup 2) are only concerned by the information 
about omega-3s for the reduction in cardiovascular risks. From figure 1, we consider the average 
value given by groups A and C, where the information about omega-3 was first provided and 
with no interference from information on methylmercury. For this group the estimation is given 
by taking into account the relative difference between the second and first bars in figure 1 since 
the third bar only integrates the omega-3 information. The average over group A leads to a value 
2 0.47Sδ =  for sardines and the average over group C leads to a value 2 0.21Tδ = − . By using 
average prices for 2002 (see table 3) and equation (14), this leads to a per-unit risk estimated at 
2
1.31tr =  and a per-unit benefit estimated at 2 3.32sh = . Those values are lower for subgroup 2 
than for subgroup 1, since methylmercury does not concern this subgroup 2. The average values 
over both subgroups (with a weight equal to 50.5% for subgroup 1) leads to a per-unit risk 
estimated at 1.45tr =  and a per-unit benefit estimated at 5.31sh = .18 
We briefly detail the calibration of the initial demand in a context of absence of information. 
Parameters of the overall demand 
1
(0, , )Kt tk t skX x p p== ∑  and 1 (0, , )Ks tk t skX x p p== ∑  (see 
equation (3) in section 3) are calibrated such as to predict prices and quantities for canned tuna 
                                                 
18 This per-unit benefit 5.31sh =  linked to omega-3 and estimated by the experiment is relatively high compared to 
an initial sardine price ˆ sp = €8.2. However, such a high level is “consistent” with the findings of Murphy and Topel 
(2006) who show a very large benefit linked to a reduction in the chances of dying from heart disease. 
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and sardines in France (under the absence of information) for the year 2002 (see table 3), the 
most recent complete year when the analysis was undertaken (Ofimer, 2003). The demand 
equations are represented by linear approximations with the corresponding elasticity at the point 
of approximation. We assigned values to the parameters based on elasticities that we estimated 
and show that canned fish are complements. The econometric model was estimated with a linear 
approximated almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) (see table 3 and appendix B).19  
The overall demands without health information (at stage i) are defined by 
t t t t sX a b p gp= − +  for tuna and s s s s tX a b p gp= − +  for sardines. With the notations of table 3, 
the calibration leads to the values ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t sa X b p gp= + − ,  ˆ ˆ/ttt t tb X pε= − ,  ˆ ˆ/st s tg X pε= , 
ˆ ˆ ˆs s s s ta X b p gp= + − , and  ˆ ˆ/sss s sb X pε= − .20 This leads to aggregated demands of the entire 
French population without information and without tax and subsidy equal to 
109596399 6991550 378407
17995428 512579 378407
t t s
s s t
X p p
X p p
= − −⎧⎨ = − −⎩
.    (15) 
Based on these demand functions, we computed the programs defined by (6) and (8) in 
section 3. We simplify the notations of section 3 by assuming that the information policy is able 
to reach a proportion 1 /k Kκ =  of all consumers at a cost C. This parameter captures the 
imperfectness of an information policy based on hospital or media diffusion, which differs from 
                                                 
19 The data used for estimating elasticities are drawn from the 2002 issues of a French household panel conducted by 
SECODIP (Société d'Etude de la Consommation, Distribution et Publicité) on household purchases. For 2002, the 
initial samples contain 5,362 households. Exclusion of households that did not report socio-demographic data results 
in a sample of 3,024. For each product, the quantity consumed and the amount spent during a year is recorded. 
Prices for non-consuming households are not available. A simple approach is taken by replacing the missing prices 
through averages calculated on data for consuming households. 
20 As we follow the Spence’s (1976) specification in section 3, the parameter g for the demand of sardines is the 
same as the one previously defined for tuna demand (see equation (3) for cross parameters in equations). Demands 
would be very close to the ones presented in equation (15) if g were defined from a calibration with the sardines 
 25
the lab context in which all participants received a clear message (see section 4). The proportion 
1 /k Kκ =  and the information cost C are exogenously given for allowing a simple comparative 
static.21  
 
5.2 Results  
Table 4 provides the economic impact of regulatory tools. Under the first fiscal program (see 
equation (6)), the budget linked to the fish regulation is not balanced (but is 
completed/diminished by a lump-sum transfer provided by the rest of the economy and taken 
into account in the welfare), while under the second fiscal program, the budget linked to the fish 
regulation is balanced (see equation (8)). For program 2, the calibrated model is essential for 
computing simulations since simple analytical solutions are not possible for this program. 
For each program, table 4 details the optimal tax/subsidy ,t st s  (a negative level for ss  
corresponds to a tax) determined with Mathematica. The second and fourth lines of each 
program present respective variations in the price of canned tuna and sardines compared to their 
initial prices ˆ tp  and ˆ sp  before any intervention. The budget linked to the regulatory policy is 
given by ( , , . )t sB t s I C . The welfare (defined by equations (6) and (8)) is given by W, including 
that under the absence of any intervention with , , 0t st s I =  (last line of table 4). Eventually, we 
provide the threshold cost C* for which the information combined with the tax/subsidy leads to 
the same welfare as the policy without information but with the tax/subsidy (namely, the welfare 
                                                                                                                                                             
quantity with  ˆ ˆ/ts t sg X pε= . Moreover, considering demands t t t t t sX a b p g p= − +  and s s s s s tX a b p g p= − +  with 
 ˆ ˆ/tst t sg X pε=  and  ˆ ˆ/sts s tg X pε=  would be also possible. 
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value given in the first column for the same fiscal program). For instance, for program 1, it 
would be * * * *( , ,0) ( , ,0)t t s s t sW p t p s B t s+ − + = ** ** ** ** *( , , ) ( , , )t t s s t sW p t p s K B t s Cκ+ − + ). 
Clearly, table 4 shows that regulation (tax/subsidy program and or information) increases 
welfare since welfare in the absence of regulation (last line of table 4) is dominated by the values 
of welfare for programs 1 and 2. Moreover, for similar values of κ  and I (namely, for the same 
column in table 4), both fiscal programs linked to regulation are relatively similar in terms of 
consequences on welfare. For each column, fiscal program 1 leads to a slightly higher welfare 
than does fiscal program 2, but program 1 leads to a fiscal deficit/surplus (see the fifth line in 
table 4). Under program 1, the spending coming from a relatively high subsidy on a relatively 
low level of consumed sardines does not correspond to revenue coming from the relatively low 
tax on a relatively large level of consumed tuna. Thus, balancing the budget under program 2 
leads to a slight tax decrease and to a slight subsidy increase compared to program 1. Program 2 
imposes a little more distortion than does program 1, leading to a slightly lower welfare under 
program 2. As welfares under programs 1 and 2 are very close for the same range of parameters, 
a regulation on a fish market may be implemented autonomously without relying on alternative 
sources of financing. 
If the proportion of informed consumers is 0.9573κ <  for program 1 and 0.9527κ <  for 
program 2, respectively, the welfare with a tax/subsidy program without any information (see the 
first column of table 4 with I=0) is higher than the welfare with both a tax/subsidy program and 
information policy. In other words, for program 1, if 0.9573κ <  and 0C ≥ , the inequality 
* * * *( , ,0) ( , ,0)t t s s t sW p t p s B t s+ − + > ** ** ** **( , , ) ( , , )t t s s t sW p t p s K B t s Cκ+ − +  is satisfied, and for 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 An alternative assumption would consist of defining an optimal level of advertising/promotion with a cost ( )C κ  
with '( ), ''( ) 0C Cκ κ >  (see table 1, p. 427, in Kinnucan and Myrlan 2001 for values of promotion elasticity for 
France). 
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program 2, * *( , ,0)t t s sW p t p s+ − > ** **( , , )t t s sW p t p s Kκ+ −  is satisfied if 0.9527κ <  and 0C ≥ . 
In this case, information policy is useless since the regulator would also impose a relatively high 
tax/subsidy for internalizing health risks/benefits for the proportion (1 κ− ) of uninformed 
consumers. This tax would be a burden for the proportion κ  of consumers informed about 
risks/benefits. A tax/subsidy program à la Pigou without information is optimal, since this 
program would directly internalize health characteristics not taken into account by unaware 
consumers.  
The information policy (I=1) is socially profitable if a large proportion of consumers can be 
informed and if the information cost C is not too large (see the threshold cost C* in table 4). This 
is the case if 0.9573κ >  for program 1 and 0.9527κ >  for program 2. Table 4 presents 
simulations corresponding to this configuration in the second and third columns where the cost 
of information is C=100 000 and κ  slightly changes to allow for a comparative static. The main 
justification for providing information is that this strategy makes many consumers aware of 
health information (see section 4) while limiting the tax burden for consumers. Thus, the tax and 
subsidy internalizing health risks/benefits for the proportion (1 κ− ) of uninformed consumers 
are low. Note that a situation of perfect information without any cost ( 1κ =  and C=0, not 
detailed in table 4) leads to the highest welfare since there is no price distortion and consumers 
make fully informed decisions. When the information is efficient, the tax/subsidy becomes 
relatively inefficient because there is a negative welfare impact on consumers already informed 
and those not at risk from mercury in comparison to those at risk. 
The tax/subsidy values with information in the second and third columns are relatively low 
compared to values without information in the first column. In the second column of table 4 
( 0.97κ = ), the tax on tuna finances the subsidy and the information for fiscal program 2. In this 
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case, the tax and the subsidy are very limited, since they only internalize health benefits/risks for 
uninformed consumers (namely, a proportion 1 0.03κ− =  of consumers). The third column 
details the optimal choice under perfect information when all consumers receive information 
( 1)κ = . Under program 1, no price distortion is necessary since the cost of information C is 
financed by other taxes/programs (with a lump-sum tax) and all the health information is directly 
internalized by consumers. Under program 2, the information policy is combined with a tax on 
both tuna and sardines for financing the information when the budget has to be balanced 
(program 2). In this case, the tax on sardines (equivalent to a high-quality product) is equal to 
-0.003 and it is larger than the tax on tuna (equivalent to a low-quality product). As under 
Ramsey pricing, it is optimal to impose the higher tax on the product with the lower demand 
elasticity (Viscusi et al., 2005). 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper improves our understanding of how instruments influence consumers’ behavior. 
There are three main implications in terms of regulatory economics. 
First, based on our calibrated model, a tax/subsidy program seems to dominate an 
information policy in the case of fish consumption with health objectives. The information policy 
combined with a tax on tuna and a subsidy on sardines is socially beneficial only if a large 
proportion of consumers can receive the health information. This means that a regulator should 
target many consumers if information is chosen as a regulatory option.  
Second, different options were considered in terms of the fiscal budget linked to the 
regulatory tools. As programs 1 and programs 2 in table 4 give relatively similar results, we 
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conclude that a regulation on a fish market may be autonomously implemented without relying 
on alternative sources of finance. In other words, a market regulation regarding a specific 
product implying risks and benefits may be independently enforced. 
Third, we showed that experimental results may help by comparing various regulatory 
scenarios. The methodology of this paper may be used by administrations, parliaments, or 
regulatory agencies for forecasting the consequences of their regulatory decisions. 
In defining the analytical framework, very restrictive assumptions were made for simplicity. 
Some extensions could be easily considered for refining our results. For instance, more fish (as 
the ones in table 1) could be added in the simulations by taking into account their content in 
omega-3s or methylmercury. The experimental procedures could be replicated with more women 
in the sample and including other fish for measuring the robustness of our estimated WTP 
changes detailed in section 4. It would also be possible to add other nutrients, such as iodine or 
phosphorus, or contaminants, such as dioxin and PCBs, for determining an exhaustive 
tax/subsidy mechanism linked to fish. One could also consider other environmental objectives, 
such as the resource depletion of certain fish species, in combination with the health 
considerations of this study.  
Producers’ profits could also be considered for extending welfare measures (table 4), even 
if, in the supply chain, the price transmission determining profits at each stage of the production 
process is very hard to obtain. In the model, we also abstracted from any regulatory cost for 
implementing taxes or subsidies. A complete cost-benefit analysis should take into account these 
parameters to determine the optimal regulation for promoting healthy food.  
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Figure 1. The effect of information in the lab experiment 
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Note: Δ* denotes significant difference at 5% as tested by the Wilcoxon test for comparing 
paired samples. 
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Table 1. Average content in omega-3s and in methylmercury for the top six fish purchased 
in France 
         Omega-3s*and**  
           g/100g 
Methylmercury*** 
       mg/kg 
Market sharea 
 in 2004 (volume) 
Canned tuna 0.25* 0.27 27% 
Salmon 2.35 0.02 10% 
Hake (Alaska) 0.11 0.06 9% 
Cod 0.09 0.10 7% 
Canned sardines 3.3 0.05 6% 
Canned mackerel 1.7 0.06 6% 
Others   35% 
Sources: * EFSA (2005, table 23 p.63); ** Sidhu (2003, table 5, p. 341); ***Table 1, p. 182, in Crépet et al. (2005).  
a Percentage based on the sum of sold volume of fresh, frozen, and canned fish purchased by consumers in France in 
2004 (OFIMER, 2005). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Statistics about the sample in the experiment 
 120 Women in the 
Experiment 
Women in Francea 
Age  
Share by age group of women between ages 18 and 45  
  
18-24 22% 24% 
25-34 44% 37% 
35-45 34% 39% 
Female working activity by age groupb 
18-24 11% 29% 
25-45 79% 81% 
Notes: a Sources:  For age in France: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/chifcle_fiche.asp?ref_id=NATCCF02120&tab_id=5 
      For activity by age group in France: 
http://www.educnet.education.fr/insee/par/travail/txactivite.htm 
           b The definition of working women includes women searching for a job, but it excludes students.  
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Table 3. Demand specifications for households that purchase both canned tuna and canned 
sardines in France in 2002 
Variable Description Values  
Tuna Overall consumption ˆ tX in France in 
2002 (in kg) 
63 845 000  
 Average price ˆ tp  per kg in 2002 (in 
euros) 
6.1  
 Supply elasticitya 0.2  
Sardines Overall consumption ˆ sX  in France in 
2002 (in kg) 
11 484 000  
 Average price ˆ sp  per kg in 2002  (in 
euros) 
8.2  
Demand elasticities1  Tuna Sardines 
 Own-price 
ttε = –0.668  ssε = –0.366 
 Cross-price 
tsε = –0.201  stε =–0.382 
Sources: OFIMER, 2003; SECODIP, 2002. 
aSee appendix B for details about the econometric estimation. 
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Table 4. Economic effects of regulation (in euros) 
 No Information 
0I =  
C=0 
Information 
I=1, 0.97β =   
C=100 000 
Information 
I=1, 1β =  
C=100 000 
Fiscal program 1    
*
tt  1.45 0.043 0 
* ˆ/t tt p (%)  23%  0.7% 0% 
*
ss  5.31 0.159 0 
- * ˆ/s ss p (%) –64% –1.9% 0% 
Budget * *( , , . )t sB t s I C     8 439 907       153 197     –100 000 
Welfare W  336 862 806 336 906 108 337 361 443 
Cost Threshold C*         143 303 
 
       498 638 
 
    
Fiscal program 2    
**
tt  1.38 0.042   0.001 
** ˆ/t tt p (%) 22%    0.68%      0.01% 
**
ss  5.64 0.164 –0.003 
- ** ˆ/s ss p (%) –0.68% –2%           0.03% 
Budget ** **( , , . )t sB t s I C  0 0 0 
Welfare W 336 811 708 336 906 091 337 261 436 
Cost Threshold C**         194 398         549 511 
    
No Policy 
( , , 0t st s I = ) 
   
Welfare W 325 166 035   
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APPENDIX A: Timing and Message of the Lab Experiment 
 
During the experimental session, women were asked to assess a choice between two types of 
fish. The women were endowed with either tuna or sardines. We refer to the fish of endowment 
as fish I and to the other as fish II. Overall, 58 women participated in the treatment with an 
endowment of tuna (group A and B) and 57 participated in the treatment with an endowment of 
sardines (group C and D). The assignment of a convened group of consumers to either treatment 
was made at random. The session was divided into eight stages. The exact transcript of the 
experiment is available upon request from the authors. 
(1) Participating women read some general instructions and signed a form stipulating that they 
accept and will follow the rules of the experiment.  
(2) They filled in a computer-assisted questionnaire on health and nutrition behavior and socio-
demographic characteristics.  
(3) They had one minute to examine cans of both tuna and sardines (see appendix A). Then the 
can price of the endowed fish I, Ip , was posted on the computer screen and participants were 
asked to give an estimation of the retail price of a can of fish II. 
(4) They had two minutes to taste both fish and to give a hedonic rating indicating their 
preference for tuna or sardines.  
(5) The choice procedure was explained and the choice experiment was conducted  
 (i)  before receiving the health information;  
(ii) after receiving a message on omega-3 in groups A and C or message on mercury in 
groups B and D; 
(iii) after receiving a message on mercury in groups A and C or a message on omega-3 in 
groups B and D. 
 The choice sheet for those with a tuna endowment was the following (and the reverse for 
those with a sardine endowment): 
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Situation 1 O  6 tuna cans            or O  1 sardines can 
Situation 2 O  6 tuna cans            or O  2 sardines cans 
Situation 3 O  6 tuna cans            or O  3 sardines cans 
Situation 4 O  6 tuna cans            or O  4 sardines cans 
Situation 5 O  6 tuna cans            or O  5 sardines cans 
Situation 6 O  6 tuna cans            or O  6 sardines cans 
Situation 7 O  6 tuna cans            or O  7 sardines cans 
Situation 8 O  6 tuna cans            or O  8 sardines cans 
Situation 9 O  6 tuna cans            or O  9 sardines cans 
Situation 10 O  6 tuna cans            or O  10 sardines cans 
Situation 11 O  6 tuna cans            or O  11 sardines cans 
Situation 12 O  6 tuna cans            or O  12 sardines cans 
 
After stage 5(i), the messages for the lab experiment was the following 
 
OMEGA-3. Fish is important for dietary balance. Fish is a good source of proteins, vitamins and 
minerals. Fish content is high in omega-3 fatty acids and low in saturated fat. 
Tuna contains six-fold less omega-3 fatty acids than sardines. [If endowment with tuna.] 
Sardines contain six-fold more omega-3 fatty acids than tuna. [If endowment with sardines] 
The regular consumption of omega-3 fatty acids helps to reduce the risks of cardiovascular 
diseases and it contributes to brain development and growth of children. Public health authorities 
advise to eat fish at least twice a week. 
 
MERCURY. Fish contains methylmercury (organic form of mercury) naturally present in water 
and coming from industrial pollutions. All fish contain traces of methylmercury. By 
accumulation, larger fish that have lived longer have the highest level of methylmercury.  
Tuna contains four-fold more methylmercury than sardines. [If endowment with tuna.] 
Sardines contain four-fold less methylmercury than tuna. [If endowment with sardines.] 
The mercury effects on health have been shown by several medical studies. The results of these 
studies show a lack of brain development in the fetus and children exposed to mercury. Public 
health authorities advise pregnant women, childbearing women, and young children to avoid the 
consumption of predatory fish such as tuna. 
 
(6) Subjects received a second set of plates for tasting the products. They had two minutes to 
taste both fish and to give a hedonic rating indicating their preference for tuna or sardines.  
(7) Participants replied to a short questionnaire about their choices.  
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(8) The experiment concluded by randomly selecting the products to be remitted to participants 
based on the selected choices. Participants also received 10 euros of indemnity and a brochure 
explaining risks linked to methylmercury. 
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APPENDIX B: Estimation of Demand Elasticities 
The demand system used for the estimation is the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980). We consider a two-stage budgeting approach. After deciding on the 
optimal expenditures allocated to canned fish consumption, the household allocates shares to 
different types i = 1, …, n of fish in order to maximize utility subject to the milk budget. The 
expenditure share of household h on product i, wih, results in 
)P/xlog(plogw hhi
n
j
jhijiih βγα ++= ∑=1  i = 1, 2, …, n (A1) 
where pjh are prices, xh measures total canned fish expenditure, and Ph denotes the price index for 
household h. Consumer theory imposes the following constraints on the AIDS expenditure-share 
equations (1): 
∑ ∑ ∑ ===
i i i
ijii 0,0,1 γβα   (adding-up)  (A2) 
∑ =
j
ij 0γ  (homogeneity) (A3) 
jiij γγ =  (symmetry) (A4) 
 
To incorporate socio-demographic variables into the demand system, we use a method of 
demographic translation. There are two ways to adjust for socio-demographic influences on 
household demand. Demographic translation preserves the linearity of the system and assumes 
that the constant terms in the share equation vary across households. Other methods (e.g., 
demographic scaling) have a nonlinear specification and allow relative prices and real 
expenditures to vary across households (Pollak and Wales, 1981, 1992). We use demographic 
translation and modify the constant in the share equations for goods ni ,...,1=  into  
∑
=
+= K
k
kikii d
1
0 ρρα   (A5) 
where ρi0 and the ρik's are parameters to be estimated and  K,...,k,dk 1= , are the socio-
demographic variables. For adding up to hold requires that 1
1
0 =∑=
n
i
iρ  and 0
1
=∑
=
n
i
ikρ . 
The full AIDS specification uses the translog price index defined as 
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Using (7) in (1) yields a nonlinear system of equations. A simplified approach is to estimate a 
linear approximated AIDS (LA/AIDS). Following Moschini (1995) and Buse and Chan (2000), 
we consider a linear approximation based on the Stone index defined as  
jh
n
j
j
*
h plogwPlog ∑== 1 .  (A7) 
 
Including the demographic translation, the finally estimated LA/AIDS for household h in 
period t results in a system of share equations to be estimated: 
( ) iP/xlogplogdw ih*hhin
j
jhij
K
k
khikiih ∀++++= ∑∑ == εβγρρ 110 .            (A8) 
The elasticities are estimated at the sample mean following an approach suggested in Alston, 
Foster and Green (1994): 
Expenditure Elasticity: 1+=
i
i
i w
βˆη         (A9) 
Uncompensated own-price elasticity: 1−−= i
i
ii
ii w
βγε      (A10) 
Uncompensated cross-price elasticity: 
i
jiij
ij w
wβγε −=      (A11) 
Compensated own-price elasticity: iiii
C
ii wηεε +=       (A12) 
Compensated cross-price elasticity: ijij
C
ij w ηεε +=       (A13) 
 
We use the French household panel SECODIP 2002 for the estimation. Excluding 
households that did not report socio-demographic data results in a sample of 3,024. As product 
groups, we consider canned tuna, canned sardines, and other canned fish (salmon, mackerel, and 
anchovies). Table B1 reports the sample statistics. 
For each product the quantity (in kg) consumed and the amount in French francs (FF) spent 
during a year are recorded. Price is derived as unit value. Prices for non-consuming households 
are not available. While procedures exist to accommodate missing prices (e.g., Griffiths and 
Valenzuela, 1998; Erdem et al., 1999), they greatly complicate the implementation of the current 
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estimation procedure. A simple approach is taken by replacing the missing prices with averages 
calculated on data for consuming households. The demographic variables include the number of 
household members (household size), monthly household income, and the socio-economic status 
of the household head. 
The LA/AIDS has been estimated for the first two equations (table B2). Parameters of the 
third equation have been obtained from the restrictions A2 – A5. Standard errors of the restricted 
parameters and of the elasticities are estimated in a nonparametric bootstrap with N=500. Price 
elasticities that are not sensitive to the monetary unit, FF or euros, are provided in table B3. In 
table 3, we used the uncompensated elasticities for the simulations since the Spence model in (1) 
defines Marshallian surpluses. 
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TABLE B1. Sample statistics, SECODIP 2002 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Quantities (kg/year)    
Canned tuna 2.451 2.901 
Canned sardines 0.729 0.970 
Other canned fish 1.122 1.663 
 
Budget shares    
Canned tuna 0.568 0.342 
Canned sardines 0.198 0.273 
Other canned fish 0.234 0.289 
 
Prices (FF)    
Canned tuna 42.442 33.622 
Canned sardines 22.391 19.347 
Other canned fish 22.158 17.105 
 
Household composition and demographics   
Household size 2.899 1.402 
Monthly household income (FF)a 13286.1   7862.3 
 
Profession of household head (dummy variables)   
Farmer 0.023  
Handcrafter, retailer 0.024  
Management 0.065  
Intermediary professions 0.152  
Employees 0.129  
Worker (left out dummy in the estimation) 0.234  
Retired 0.319  
Other nonactive persons 0.030  
aIncome categories have been transformed to a continuous variable using the midpoint of income intervals. 
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TABLE B2. LA/AIDS estimates 
Variable Canned tuna Canned sardines Canned other fish 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff.a Std.Err. 
Constant 0.364*** 0.016 0.292*** 0.016 0.343*** 0.019 
Log price tuna 0.232*** 0.006 -0.099*** 0.04 -0.133*** 0.007 
Log price sardines -0.099*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.006 -0.018*** 0.004 
Log price other fish 0.133*** 0.005 -0.018*** 0.005 0.151*** 0.008 
Log (X/P) 0.076*** 0.004 -0.041*** 0.004 -0.035*** 0.007 
Household size 0.007* 0.004 -0.014*** 0.004 0.007* 0.004 
Income  -0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Farmer -0.082*** 0.030 0.035 0.029 0.046 0.032 
Handcrafter, retailer -0.041 0.029 0.009 0.028 0.031 0.031 
Management 0.010 0.021 0.001 0.020 -0.010 0.022 
Intermediary professions 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.014 -0.020 0.014 
Employees 0.015 0.015 -0.012 0.014 -0.003 0.015 
Worker  -b  -b  -b  
Retired -0.087*** 0.013 0.085*** 0.013 0.002 0.014 
Other non active persons 0.041 0.027 0.078*** 0.026 -0.037 0.029 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Canned Tuna: R2 =0.469, Canned sardines: R2 = 0.263. 
aCalculated from constraints A2  - A5 . Standard errors obtained in a bootstrap of N=500. 
b Left out dummy variable. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE B3. Price and expenditure elasticities 
Product groups Price elasticities Expenditure 
elasticities 
 Canned tuna Canned 
sardines 
Other canned 
fish 
 
 
Uncompensated  
   
Canned tuna -0.668*** -0.201*** -0.265*** 1.134*** 
Canned sardines -0.382*** -0.366*** -0.044* 0.791*** 
Other canned fish -0.483*** -0.049** -0.320*** 0.851*** 
     
Compensated      
Canned tuna -0.024** 0.024** 0.000  
Canned sardines 0.068** -0.209*** 0.142***  
Other canned fish 0.000 0.120*** -0.120***  
Asymptotic standard errors obtained in a bootstrap with N=500 are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
